

UNCLASSIFIED

20-01-2014

SUBMISSION TO THE 2014 AUSTRALIAN AVIATION SAFETY REGULATION REVIEW

TERMS OF REFERENCE – ‘any other safety related matters’

EMPOWER THE WORKFORCE - TO RAPIDLY REPLACE ENTRENCHED ‘AIRPORT CULTURE’ AND ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF ALL WHO ENTER AN AIRPORT PRECINCT

OVERVIEW

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Affairs, the Hon Warren Truss, is to be commended for calling a review of aviation safety regulation by an experienced panel, at a time when new, fully integrated measures are needed.

Mr Truss is the only serving parliamentarian with past Ministerial experience and interest in aviation and passion for improving aviation safety and security.

The airport workplace and public safety remains a massive hole in Australia’s approach to aviation safety, which needs to be rectified well ahead of the extra risks associated with the G20, to be faced later this year.

Safety and security should be inextricably interrelated on airports by engaging the total workforce in a most cost effective manner, at employer expense.

Hopefully this will be an outcome of the review?

POST WHEELER TO NEW A1A ‘HARMONIZATION’ OF RESOURCES

Many major incidents, reported and unreported, involving both passengers and freight, continue to occur at Australian airports, due to adherence to outdated, old stovepipe, safety and security procedures under the Wheeler model.

The new HSAP approach of harmonising public safety and security resources enhances public safety and security 24x7 throughout the airport precinct, by engaging the total workforce on an airport, with no exceptions.

This includes all airline/airport/Customs/Immigration/AQIS/Air Services staff and all non-aviation workers involved in retail, food and beverage, currency exchange, car rental, cleaning and tourist information bureaus etc.

THE RISKS

All Australian commercial airports remain easy to access and vulnerable soft targets for terrorists and extremists, in fact anyone intent on doing harm or wanting to make a statement. This leaves airports wide open to the risk of closures and damage to infrastructure and aircraft, should a major incident occur.

Potential incidents include: bombings, fires, explosions, shootings, gas or fuel leaks; or a crucial denial of service attack; computer IT interference with aircraft, airport control systems or air traffic control. Many inbound international aircraft arriving direct en route to BNE/SYD/MEL from the US are at a critical fuel stage 200k from the Australian coast!

Closure of a major capital city airport would be a billion-dollar-a-week hit on the economy (GDP) and would have a damaging impact on tourism and Australia's reputation as a safe destination.

ASIC passes are abused and misused daily. Security cleared ASIC pass-holders routinely enable everyone from relatives, to dubious friends and casual cleaners, to gain access to all areas of the nation's airports. Airport unions have campaigned for more than a decade, for a severe tightening of the access process.

Commercial aircraft are left refuelled, unlocked and un-guarded on many airports overnight – nationwide.

Airport owners ignore the requirement for capital city terminals to stage annual evacuation exercises and have actively blocked the call for passenger photo-ID verification at departure gates; a requirement in other countries.

It is a simple process to consign an IED as freight on commercial flights from regional and rural airports, timed to detonate on approach to a capital city airport or for the item to be loaded onto an international flight.

The most recent incident involving a Qantas Link regional service occurred on Tuesday 14 January 2014. This required the evacuation of T2 at Sydney Airport, when unscreened passengers arriving from Armidale entered a sterile area.

<http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/2014/01/14/15/29/security-breach-forces-sydney-airport-evacuation>

G20

Militants and Jihadists have demonstrated a resurgence of their activities against the Western world. ASIO is expressing concern for the future safety of Australia.

Terrorists are well organised, trained; and undertake extensive planning to cause havoc to achieve mass casualties and destruction of infrastructure to further their cause.

This year, Australia hosts G20 meetings in Brisbane, Sydney and Cairns. The hosting honour comes with a history of planned violence and disruption in cities where meetings have been held. The G20 is a catalyst for disgruntled and violence prone individuals, groups and Islamic fundamentalists.

It is easier to undertake a terrorist strike on an airport from 'landside' than 'airside'. G20 security planning focuses reliance on a large contingent of AFP and ADF personnel in Brisbane, in the home State of Mr Truss and AG, Senator George Brandis QC! The AFP is highly professional and does some great work, but cannot be everywhere to counter risk; whilst greater monitoring can be achieved with an empowered workforce, to augment AFP resources.

A 'ring of steel' did not stop a dangerous prank being perpetrated by the ABC's 'Chaser' crew, when it successfully gate-crashed 2007 APEC security in Sydney with a fake 'Delegate limousine'.

Savvy terrorists, (both home grown and imported) and professional demonstrators are less likely to arrive in Australia via BNE, than other gateway airports. Instead some will choose entry points such as Adelaide, Darwin and Perth; and then travel to Brisbane via regional airports, such as Lismore or Grafton, or by road, or rail.

Bombing of any major Australian airport during the G20 would be a global Public Relations victory for the perpetrators and a disaster for the Australian Government.

Mr Truss confirmed in late December 2013, more than 300 convicted criminals were issued ASIC/MSIC passes on appeal, under the previous Government. This astonishingly flawed decision was reportedly justified on the basis applicants were not deemed 'terrorist threats'.

There is an urgent need to enhance employment screening of all people who work on airports.

This will reduce crime levels, employee staff management problems and improve efficiencies, productivity, service delivery, as well as enhancing safety and airports' reputation for customer service and making air travel a friendlier experience.

Normal, acceptable employment screening practices, should include police checks, medical certificates and at least three referee checks to enhance the suitability of people employed on airports.

The employment of people on airports with a history of crime or other issues, such as drug/steroid use fosters a culture of negative work practices and should be discouraged.

Improved efficiency and productivity on airports will come from employing people with a good attitude, correct qualifications, background and work history.

AIRPORTS AND CRIME

For many years, police have been well aware of criminal activities, including drugs and guns entering Australia via major airports and then moved around Australia through other airports. On occasions Government employees on airports and gangs have been involved.

GROWING THREAT

The environment has changed. Australian citizens are now participating in terrorist training and Middle East conflicts and being radicalised against Australian values and culture, as reported by ASIO.

There are 66 Australians known to have been trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan by al Qaida and other terrorist groups, who all flew out of Australian airports and then returned home via capital city airports.

Terrorist cells such as al Qaida usually consist of six to 10 members, which mean there may be at least six unrelated 'sleeper cells' in Australia.

More than 100 Australian Islamic extremists are known to have been fighting in Syria. They all left home via Australian airports and will eventually return by air, radicalized with battlefield and bomb-making experience ready to train others. ASIO has reportedly confiscated 38 Australian passports in the past 18 months and cancelled 20 in December, to stop citizens training and fighting with overseas terrorists,

Another 22 Australian Muslim fanatics disappeared in Yemen, after drone attacks eliminated some high profile terrorists. If they are still alive, they will return to Australia on commercial flights, through Australian airports.

These dangerous Australians pose a major risk to National Security and the Australian way of life. New, enhanced, fully integrated public safety and security measures which prevent/mitigate terrorist acts and expose others including radicalized Australians from targeting our airports, are a necessity. Australia must 'harmonise' all measures and move on from current old hat 'stovepipe' methods to an all-inclusive approach, which uses all resources.

MITIGATION SOLUTION

The value and engagement of all members of an airport workforce, referred to as '*HUMINT*' (Human Intelligence/Intervention/Monitoring) to detect, report and mitigate safety/security risks has been underestimated, overlooked or ignored, in Australia.

The focus has been on police presence designed to create 'a perception of security'; airport security patrols, CCTV, physical controls, scanning, X-raying of items and the use of wands.

A change has occurred in major industries ranging from retail, to resources, to the finance sector where employees are now much more engaged and given a role in enhancing efficiencies and productivity. This 'harmonization' approach needs to be introduced on all airports and major infrastructures. The PRC is an early adopter of 'harmonization' and rolling the process out on airports.

Some of the world's biggest and best airports have reduced the presence of uniformed, heavily armed police and security personnel, which are known to increase passenger anxiety levels and dampen travel ambitions.

The added engagement and role of the workforce is the most cost effective way to improve the safety of airport workers, flight crews, millions of passengers and visitors to airports. 'HUMINT' better secures airports, including all transactions, from airfreight to the safety of tourists and enhances the safety of residential suburbs around airports or in flight paths

HSAP RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1) ***Every** member of an airport workforce, (from cleaners to fast food workers to management) to be trained and inducted to undertake a safety and security role when on the precinct, enabled and empowered to immediately detect, locate and report any incident or suspicious activity. A1A (AVSEC-1-ALERT™) is the **only** fully integrated 'harmonization' training package, delivered face-to-face or on-line, in any language. Initial A1A rollout has been applauded by airport staff.*

All who work on an airport have a role in protecting their workplace. Reliance on CCTV, scanners, uniformed security/ AFP officers / State police are only part of the AVSEC mix. These measures cannot provide best practice maximum coverage of the precinct, from the taxi rank to 'airside' to maintenance areas, to food delivery.

HSAP experts with more than 150 years combined security/intelligence, law enforcement, crisis management and airline experience have developed AVSEC-1-ALERT™ (A1A) - a fully integrated, all inclusive approach to airport public safety and security. A1A surpasses the nine-year-old "Wheeler Review".

First deployed in Victoria, on LINFOX-owned Avalon Airport, A1A was created to help overcome blinkered, out-dated, stovepipe/silo methodology still used on airports. A1A is designed to engage, train, empower and convert the nation's **300,000 strong** airport workforce, into an army of 600,000 active 'eyes and ears'!

In many other areas of the national workplace, job candidates are expected to obtain qualifications applicable to the role they seek, at their own expense. Employers can use existing compulsory training budgets to safeguard their staff and their workplace.

The anomaly is the lack of effective public safety/security induction training for all workers at designated 'Places of Mass Gathering' including airports, seaports, and major rail and bus terminals. There is nothing in place to enable every member of the national airport workforce to report anything out of the ordinary – on site.

The AFP 'Airport Watch' remains flawed, because it is a classic stovepipe model and requires the public to provide information to a call centre in Canberra, preventing real time reporting and response on the airport.

A1A is designed to change the entrenched 'security culture' on Australian airports.

A1A enables the total airport workforce to have a role in identifying and reporting anything unusual, suspicious, dangerous or criminal. We strongly recommend A1A be quickly implemented on the Brisbane, Cairns, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast, Lismore and Grafton airports, ahead of the upcoming 2014 G20 Summit.

A1A is the only package formally endorsed by the TWU of Australia and AIPA (Australian and International Pilots Association) and meets all UN ICAO Chapter 17 training requirements for delivery on airports, in 191 member countries.

- 2) Employment Screening. All people who work on airports should be subject to bi-annual police checks, provide three different and non-related referee checks, and provide medical health checks. This will enhance the quality of staff, improve efficiencies and productivity, reduce crime and criminality and make airports a friendlier safer place.*
- 3) The practice of using casual, untrained baggage handlers, who have not been cleared by ASIO, should be banned nationwide.*
- 4) For the G20, recovery preparation procedures should be put in place to cover any issues which may impact on international aircraft 200 k off-shore on approach from the US when fuel levels are critical. Any deviation may cause major issues.*
- 5) Continuous upgrading of IT security is vital, including access control measures and blocking unauthorised access to IT hardware.*
- 6) Verification of traveller. Prior to boarding an aircraft the name on the passenger boarding pass needs to be confirmed by the person travelling at the gate, by presenting appropriate photo ID, such as a driver's licence, passport, library or club membership card.*
- 7) Day prior to and during the G20 the following should be addressed:*
 - a) Water bottles should not be carried onto aircraft. (Acid and other chemicals may be used as a weapon.)*
 - b) No vehicles to be parked outside the fence at the end of runways as they could be used to launch a weapon or fire a missile. (Shoulder launched missiles stolen some years ago from the Army Weapons facility in NSW have not been recovered)*
 - c) Stricter controls, including inspection of hand luggage, laptops and iPhones taken onto aircraft during the G20 should be considered. (Plastic guns, mobile phone & key ring guns and plastic explosives can remain undetected.)*

- d) *No cargo should be loaded onto any aircraft, which has not been inspected and/ or X-rayed, during the G20 timeframe.
(These additional temporary safety and security measures should be advertised to the travelling public two weeks prior to G20.)*

BACKGROUND TO HSAP

HSAP recommendations were adopted by the 2012 Senate Inquiry covering airport security. (See attached)

The A1A consortium leadership team consists of: Roger Henning, Michael Roach, Dr Tony Zalewski, (one of the worlds' most highly respected public safety experts) and Andrew Shea, Compliance Manager, at Complex Institute of Education. Full backgrounds are available on LINKEDIN.


We would appreciate an opportunity to introduce A1A to the Review Panel and advisors to Mr Truss, to demonstrate the cost benefits, more effective use of total resources, plus enhanced safety and security for passengers.

HSAP is available to consult to the Australian Government on G20 requirements and upgrading security on all commercial airports.

Google: AVSEC-1-ALERT™, to view a four minute clip summarising the protection of the workforce, travelling public and critical infrastructure worth in excess of \$44-billion across Australia.

All Government related content, including references to terrorist activity, in this submission is on the public record. An overview of A1A was emailed to Mr Truss and the Attorney General, Senator George Brandis QC, in late 2013

Yours faithfully



A1A Youtube clip.url

Roger Henning MAPIO FAIM CPM FPRIA
Director – Global Operations



Attachment: HSAP submission to 2012 Senate Inquiry into Airport Security



COPY/ATTACHMENT 20-02-2014

Inquiry into the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012

To: Committee Secretary
Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee
PO Box 6100 Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600 Australia

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the four proposed amendments to the Act and Regulations.

Homeland Security Asia/Pacific Pty Ltd (HSAP) commends the excellent work of the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee.

HSAP supports initiatives taken to improve airport security!

This includes the expansion of scanner capabilities; and the need to protect each airport worker, the travelling public, aircraft; and airport infrastructure with a replacement value of **\$44-billion**.

Closure of Sydney Airport, for example, due to a terrorist act, would be a one-\$1-billion-a-week hit on the economy.

HSAP wishes to stress the following points:

- Full body scanners are **NOT** a total solution - simply one element of 'landside' airport security, to be deployed at some international terminal departure gates! A holistic, integrated solution is required.
- There is **NO** single solution to protecting passengers, aircraft, the workforce and infrastructure!
- US Intelligence is in possession of a step-by-step handbook on how to penetrate an airport workforce and perpetrate terrorist acts! It was recovered from Osama bin Laden's home, after he was eliminated and provides a simple guide to would-be terrorists on how to carry out atrocities at airports.
- It is possible to smuggle a readily available item, which is also a lethal weapon, onto any flight, concealed in cabin baggage, including laptops, mobile phones and other devices.
- Other threats not addressed by full body scanners include: modified mobile phone four-shot guns and two-shot key ring guns! Mobile phones are capable of detonating a bomb in checked luggage. A pressure bomb secreted in a cargo hold - can be detonated remotely, in-flight, over a city, or at a terminal,

RESPONSE TO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

- (1) *Allow aviation screening officers to assume that a person who presents at an aviation security screening point consents to any screening procedure, with the exception of a frisk search, unless the person expressly states their refusal to undergo a particular screening procedure;*

COMMENT: Regardless of regulations, there will always be passengers who will refuse to conform.

Refusal will undoubtedly cause delays, heated arguments, possibly violent outbursts, unrest for other passengers and create public safety risks and a threat to the safety and security of airport workers.

ACTION REQUIRED: To mitigate adverse passenger reaction, HSAP recommends clear signage, including a stick-image outline, be placed well before entering each screening area! This would help make passengers well aware of requirements.

CCTV should be deployed to monitor the approach to full body scanners, to capture images of anyone who balks and walks away.

Each full-body scanner should be surrounded by bomb-blast walls, designed to reduce the impact of an explosion, triggered by a 'home grown' terrorist deliberately targeting a terminal. Such a disaster would gain maximum impact and worldwide media coverage.

- (2) *Prescribe that a randomly selected person who refuses to undergo a screening procedure will not be granted clearance and will be unable to pass through the screening point;*

COMMENT: Screening personnel can expect verbal abuse and possibly extreme behavior when any passenger is denied access to a flight! (Some ethnic groups travelling to the Middle East are extremely rude and demand to take excess baggage on board). Processing such highly emotional people is difficult work for ground staff.


- (3) *Repeal the current provision allowing passengers to request a frisk search as an alternative to another screening procedure;*

COMMENT: Frisk searches should remain a secondary option.

- (4) List the types of equipment that may be used for aviation security screening purposes, including metal detection, explosive trace detection and active millimeter wave body scanning equipment.

COMMENT: It is essential to designate and list approved equipment! To maximize pre-departure passenger screening, biometric facial recognition technology, used to match arriving international passengers against watch lists, should be integrated into full body scanner units.

Yours Faithfully



Roger Henning FAMI CPM FPRIA MAIPOIO
CEO

19 March 2012

Ref: RH/MR/JH/ Senate



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