



**Australian Government**

**Department of Infrastructure, Transport,  
Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts**

# Improving the reporting and publishing of data on airline performance and competition

Consultation paper

January 2026



© Commonwealth of Australia 2026

### **Ownership of intellectual property rights in this publication**

Unless otherwise noted, copyright (and any other intellectual property rights, if any) in this publication is owned by the Commonwealth of Australia (referred to below as the Commonwealth).

### **Disclaimer**

The material contained in this publication is made available on the understanding that the Commonwealth is not providing professional advice, and that users exercise their own skill and care with respect to its use, and seek independent advice if necessary.

The Commonwealth makes no representations or warranties as to the contents or accuracy of the information contained in this publication. To the extent permitted by law, the Commonwealth disclaims liability to any person or organisation in respect of anything done, or omitted to be done, in reliance upon information contained in this publication.

### **Creative Commons licence**



With the exception of (a) the Coat of Arms; (b) the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts photos and graphics; (c) content supplied by third parties; (d) content otherwise labelled; copyright in this publication is licensed under a Creative Commons BY Attribution 4.0 International Licence.

### **Use of the Coat of Arms**

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) sets the terms under which the Coat of Arms is used. Please refer to the [Commonwealth Coat of Arms Information and Guidelines | PM&C](#).

### **Image credit**

Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts

### **Contact us**

This publication is available in PDF format. All other rights are reserved, including in relation to any departmental logos or trademarks which may exist. For enquiries regarding the licence and any use of this publication, please contact:

Email: [AVPOL@infrastructure.gov.au](mailto:AVPOL@infrastructure.gov.au)

Website: [www.infrastructure.gov.au/have-your-say/](http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/have-your-say/)

## **Acknowledgment of Country**

First Nations people have the oldest continuing cultures in the world. It is fitting to reflect on the thousands of generations of traditional knowledges that First Nations people hold, and generously share.

We acknowledge the diversity of First Nations cultures, languages and practices across the country and the resilience of First Nations people in keeping these alive. In delivering this consultation paper, we recognise the importance of listening to the voices and perspectives of local First Nations people and responding to the uniqueness of each place.

We thank First Nations people for their continuing custodianship of, and care for, the Country that we live and work on today.

## Table of contents

<b>Summary</b>	<b>4</b>
Have your say .....	4
Next steps .....	4
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
Background .....	5
<b>1. Supporting transparency and scrutiny</b>	<b>7</b>
1.1 What is being proposed?.....	7
1.2 Increasing disclosure .....	7
1.3 Strengthening reporting on performance and competition .....	9
1.4 Supporting transparency and scrutiny – questions.....	9
<b>2. Reporting on airline delay and cancellation</b>	<b>10</b>
2.1 What is being proposed?.....	10
2.2 What we have already heard .....	11
2.3 Reporting on airline delay and cancellation – questions .....	11
<b>3. Impact of changes</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Appendix A: Selected current ACCC reporting (major airlines) and similar BITRE reporting</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Appendix B: IATA delay codes (Letter Method) – extract</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Appendix C: IATA schedule change codes, proposed as cancellation reasons</b>	<b>17</b>

## Summary

The Australian Government Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts (the department) is seeking feedback on two airline reporting initiatives in the government's *Aviation White Paper – Towards 2050*:<sup>1</sup>

- require airlines to report reasons for delays and cancellations (Initiative 3)
- publish additional data on airline performance and aviation competition (Initiative 16).

## Have your say

Submissions in response to this consultation paper are due by 10 February 2026. To make a submission, visit the department's website: [www.infrastructure.gov.au/have-your-say](http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/have-your-say)

To help you respond, we have provided consultation questions throughout the paper. Your submission, including any personal information supplied, is being collected by the department in accordance with the *Privacy Act 1988*.

The department will make written submissions to this consultation paper publicly available in full on the department's website unless you indicate you would like all or part of your submission to remain in confidence.

Any questions relating to the submission process can be directed to [AVPOL@infrastructure.gov.au](mailto:AVPOL@infrastructure.gov.au).

## Next steps

The government will consider feedback received through this consultation process to consider amendments to the Air Navigation Regulation 2016.

The department may conduct further consultation with key stakeholders to discuss interests and concerns raised in their written feedback.

---

<sup>1</sup><https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/department/media/publications/aviation-white-paper-towards-2050>

## Introduction

Aviation is crucial to the Australian way of life. Air travel connects Australians across our vast continent, and to family and friends overseas. It enables access to international markets, for both people and goods, expanding business opportunities that facilitate our economic growth.

In August 2024, the government released the *Aviation White Paper – Towards 2050*, setting the long-term policies to guide the next generation of growth and innovation for the economically critical aviation sector.<sup>2</sup> It includes 56 initiatives to improve the industry’s safety, productivity, competitiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

In the white paper, the government identified opportunities to strengthen reporting of data from airlines – to increase transparency and public accountability of industry performance and conduct, benefit passengers and increase productivity. This consultation paper addresses two specific related initiatives.

## Background

The government, via the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE) and its predecessors, has monitored and produced statistics on the aviation sector for many decades, with some records going back to the 1940s.

Specifically, the government currently has powers to collect a range of statistical and cost data from airlines and owners of aircraft engaged in air transport services, under the Air Navigation Regulation 2016.<sup>3</sup> Statistical data includes passenger and freight traffic data, fuel consumption, revenue and cost statistics and financial statements.

BITRE uses data collected under the regulation to conduct economic analysis and research and produce regular statistical publications, available at [www.bitre.gov.au/statistics/aviation](http://www.bitre.gov.au/statistics/aviation).

As part of this work, BITRE monitors the punctuality and reliability of major domestic airlines operating between Australian airports. BITRE collects data on the scheduled and actual time of departure and arrival of flights, as well as cancellation rates. However, if a flight is delayed or cancelled, it does not currently record the cause.

Separately, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) monitors the prices, costs and profits of the major domestic airlines (Qantas Group, Regional Express and Virgin).<sup>4</sup> The ACCC uses data published by BITRE and data collected directly from airlines to report quarterly on airline performance and aviation competition: see [www.accc.gov.au/about-us/publications/serial-publications/domestic-airline-competition-monitoring-reports](http://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/publications/serial-publications/domestic-airline-competition-monitoring-reports).

The white paper identified opportunities to update airline data collection and reporting for:

- delays and cancellations
- other indicators of performance and competition.

The white paper highlighted the importance of high quality and accessible data to support a safe, sustainable and efficient aviation sector that provides a high standard of service and good prices for Australians. The initiatives described in this paper form part of a broader package of work, including aviation consumer protections and reforms to the Sydney Airport Demand Management Framework.

<sup>2</sup> [Aviation White Paper – Toward 2050](#), August 2024

<sup>3</sup> [Air Navigation Regulation 2016 - Federal Register of Legislation](#) – part 2

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.accc.gov.au/by-industry/travel-and-airports/domestic-airline-monitoring>, accessed 22 July 2025.

As part of aviation consumer protections, the consumer ombudsperson will be able to look into why a specific flight may have been cancelled or delayed when handling an individual consumer complaint. The government is consulting separately on these consumer protections.

The reasons for delays and cancellations may also be utilised by the slot manager at Sydney Airport as part of overseeing compliance with the slot management framework.

# 1. Supporting transparency and scrutiny

In the Aviation White Paper, the government committed to:

## Initiative

- 16 Publish additional data on airline performance and aviation competition.** BITRE has powers to collect data from airlines under the Air Navigation Regulation 2016; however, the regulation limits publication of this data. The government will consult on amendments to this regulation by 2026 to enable the collection and publication of more detailed data to support increased transparency and scrutiny of airline performance.

BITRE will also develop and report on aviation competition indicators to monitor trends in the sector.

## 1.1 What is being proposed?

The government has committed to consult on amendments to the Air Navigation Regulation to enable the collection and publication of more detailed data. It is proposed that new provisions be included in this regulation to identify individual domestic airlines' statistics in BITRE publications (where it is warranted).

The government does not plan to change current disclosure arrangements for international aviation services or aircraft operators in general and sport aviation.<sup>5</sup>

## 1.2 Increasing disclosure

This paper seeks your views on reforms to the 'confidential information' clause in the Air Navigation Regulation (refer to Box 1). The objective is to amend the clause to permit increased disclosure of statistical information, particularly individual responses from airlines (where warranted), in the interests of public transparency and competition.

### Box 1: Air Navigation Regulation 2016

#### 10 Confidential information

If a person has obtained information in accordance with subsection 7(2) or 8(2), the person must not disclose the information in a way that allows individual responses to be identified, except:

- (a) in accordance with section 9; or
- (b) in the course of performing a function under the Act or this instrument; or
- (c) where the person who provided the information has given their consent to the disclosure of the information.

Amendments to 'Confidential information' could include:

- a new exception from the disclosure restriction for certain information; or specifying in the Air Navigation Regulation that it is a function of the Secretary or their delegate that they may disclose certain information
- a new process for claims against disclosure or for information sharing – for example:
  - a new provision of the Air Navigation Regulation, an explicit process for claims against disclosure and / or

<sup>5</sup> General aviation includes 'aerial work, own use business flying, instructional flying, personal and pleasure flying and other flying': see Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics, [https://www.bitre.gov.au/statistics/aviation/general\\_aviation](https://www.bitre.gov.au/statistics/aviation/general_aviation), accessed 5 May 2025

- an explicit framework for BITRE to share information on a limited basis, such as with the ACCC or Productivity Commission. Analogous models already applicable to aviation include *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* section 95ZN on confidential information or *Sydney Airport Demand Management Act 1997* Part 7A on information management.

In any event, when BITRE requests information from airlines, BITRE could notify each airline that it may publish the information; and invite the airline to submit reasons why BITRE should not publish any particular information.

Table 1 shows the effect of amending the ‘Confidential information clause’ on BITRE’s existing reporting.

Table 1: Changes to BITRE reporting with proposed changes to disclosure

BITRE reporting	Effect of amending BITRE disclosure limits
<b>Price and quality (reliability)</b>	
Domestic on time performance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• arrivals on time %</li> <li>• departures on time %</li> <li>• cancellations</li> </ul>	BITRE currently identifies airlines, with their consent <sup>6</sup> . Under this proposal BITRE will no longer need to seek individual airlines’ consent.
<b>Share and capacity</b>	
Domestic regular public transport passenger traffic (total passengers carried millions) – airlines aggregated	BITRE currently does not identify individual airline responses – it publishes a total figure that aggregates all airline responses.  BITRE could identify each domestic airline’s passenger traffic and share, if warranted. Under this proposal BITRE will not be required to seek individual airlines’ consent to publish this statistic.  BITRE can already identify an individual airline’s figures for international flights. <sup>7</sup> In addition, the ACCC already reports such statistics for domestic flights.
Revenue passenger kilometres (billions) – airlines aggregated	BITRE currently does not identify individual airline responses – it publishes a total figure that aggregates all airline responses.  BITRE could identify each domestic airline’s statistics, if warranted. Under this proposal BITRE will not be required to seek individual airlines’ consent to publish this statistic.  BITRE can already identify an individual airline’s figures for international flights. <sup>8</sup>
Available seats (millions) – airlines aggregated	
Available seat kilometres (billions) – airlines aggregated	
Aircraft trips (000s) – airlines aggregated	
Airport traffic data <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• revenue passenger and aircraft movements – domestic and regional</li> <li>• total passengers</li> </ul>	

<sup>6</sup> Data currently reported for about 60 highest passenger volume competitive routes (those with more than one provider)

<sup>7</sup> The Air Navigation Regulation restricts publication or disclosure of information collected if it is in a way that allows individual responses to be identified (clause 10). Exceptions include, in summary: i. information, typically on international operations, given to the International Civil Aviation Organization; ii. where the information provider has consented to disclosure.

<sup>8</sup> As above.

This proposed change would also apply to data reported under Aviation White Paper initiative 3, discussed in section 2 of this paper. That is, BITRE would be able to report the information by identified airline.

### 1.3 Strengthening reporting on performance and competition

In conjunction with the regulatory changes proposed above that would allow BITRE to share and publish more data, the government will report on aviation competition indicators, such as:

- number of domestic routes served by each airline
- average number of airlines operating on routes
- share of seats operated by low cost carriers.

These metrics are indicators of market structure which can be used to analyse the level and nature of competition. BITRE can compile these indicators from information airlines already lodge with BITRE and / or the ACCC that is publicly available on the ACCC's website.

In summary, no regulatory changes are sought to enable BITRE to collect additional information – except for data proposed below in section 2. **Reporting on airline delay and cancellation.** Under the existing regulations, BITRE can collect information on traffic, fuel consumption, revenue and cost statistics, and financial statements.

BITRE will also expand its databases and reporting to include some of the data outputs the ACCC publishes on its website about major airlines:

- average fare revenue per domestic passenger
- airline's share of domestic passengers flown – all routes aggregated *and by route category*
- number of passengers on domestic routes serviced by number of airline groups (1, 2 and more).

Expanding BITRE's databases to include selected ACCC data outputs will enhance BITRE's ability and capacity to report over the long term, to the government and public, on trends in aviation competition.

To clarify respective roles:

- the ACCC will continue to use data it collects from airlines as an evidence base for assessing competition in domestic aviation and identifying any concerns.<sup>9</sup>
- BITRE will remain a long term custodian and 'go to' source of longitudinal data, for various government and public purposes.

**Appendix A** compares some of the BITRE and ACCC reporting. The ACCC outputs are generally found in the ACCC's quarterly airline monitoring reports and supplementary tables available on the ACCC's website.<sup>10</sup>

### 1.4 Supporting transparency and scrutiny – questions

1. What data, if any, should still be aggregated, so as to balance commercial sensitivities with accessibility, increased transparency and public accountability (especially for consumers)?
2. Should there be thresholds as to which businesses will report particular information, such as total business revenue or share of passengers on a route or route category?

<sup>9</sup> The government's Direction to the ACCC to monitor domestic air passenger transport services expires on 31 December 2026. Extension beyond this date will be a future decision for government.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, the Appendix and Supplementary Data at <https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/publications/serial-publications/domestic-airline-competition-monitoring-reports/domestic-airline-competition-in-australia-august-2025>

## 2. Reporting on airline delay and cancellation

In the Aviation White Paper, the government committed to:

### Initiative

- 3 Adopt a 'show cause' arrangement, requiring **airlines to report the reasons for delays and cancellations** as part of the airlines' regular reporting of flight data to the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE).

The Aviation Industry Ombudsperson will also have powers to request additional information from airlines in relation to specific flights.<sup>11</sup>

Regular reporting of additional data about industry performance and conduct will increase transparency and public accountability for on-time performance and support the government to identify if further regulatory action is required.

Further information to support the reason for this initiative is found in chapter 3 of the Aviation White Paper.

### 2.1 What is being proposed?

It is proposed that a new provision be included in the Air Navigation Regulation requiring airlines to record the reasons for flight delays and cancellations, and, when requested, provide to the department this information as part of regular reporting of flight data to BITRE.

Standardised lists of reasons are sought for reporting, data analysis and publishing and to minimise the regulatory burden on industry stakeholders.

A list of delay reasons is proposed to be drawn from the International Air Transport Association's (IATA's) Airport Handling Manual (AHM), referred to as AHM 732 (refer to **Appendix B**).<sup>12</sup> The use of these reasons would parallel an IATA initiative involving electronic reporting of these reasons between industry stakeholders.

A list of cancellation reasons (refer to **Appendix C**) is proposed to be drawn from IATA's Standard Schedules Information Manual (SSIM).<sup>13</sup>

Leveraging IATA's framework is also being considered in the context of airline reporting to the Sydney Airport slot manager. While it is expected that the proposed reporting would be considered by the aviation consumer ombudsperson in resolving individual consumer disputes, to determine the consumer remedy available under the aviation consumer protection framework, further information might be needed by the ombudsperson to determine whether a particular flight delay or cancellation was within or outside an airline's control. Consultation about ombudsperson powers is being conducted separately.

The thresholds for publishing the reasons for flight delays and cancellations are proposed to initially remain consistent with the existing criteria established by BITRE in relation to on-time performance for domestic aviation, and current BITRE reporting periods for flight cancellations<sup>14</sup>. However, the routes,

<sup>11</sup> Consultation about ombudsperson powers is being conducted separately.

<sup>12</sup> IATA's AHM is a comprehensive resource that encompasses all industry-endorsed policies and standards crucial for ensuring safe and efficient ground operations [IATA - Airport Handling Manual \(AHM\)](#)

<sup>13</sup> The SSIM is the official set of standards, guiding the industry with recommended practices, messaging formats and data processing procedures that are to be used by all IATA member airlines and their business partners for the exchange of airline schedules, communication of airport coordination information and minimum connect time data [IATA - Standard Schedules Information Manual \(SSIM\)](#)

<sup>14</sup> Australian domestic routes for which the passenger load averaged 8,000 or more passengers per month over the previous six months and where two or more airlines operated in competition on those routes [Domestic on time performance | Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics](#)

domestic and international, as well as the reporting period for flight cancellations, could be expanded in the future.

While still increasing the transparency and public accountability for on-time performance, it is proposed publication of the delay and cancellation data would involve aggregation of the data. The reasons for delays would potentially be published by route and airline as being due to matters associated with:

1. Aircraft arrival
2. Ramp handling and load control
3. Aircraft servicing
4. Crew and flight documentation
5. Passenger handling
6. Departure disruption
7. Aircraft departure

The reasons for cancellations would be based on IATA schedule change codes (per **Attachment B**) and include matters associated with:

1. Restrictions on airspace, airfield or a runway
2. Shortages related to crew, equipment and fuel
3. Aircraft damage
4. Ground handling
5. Holiday, industrial dispute and commercial reasons
6. Aircraft performance
7. Political situation
8. Aircraft positioning, re-positioning and rotation
9. Weather conditions
10. Operational, technical or other reasons

The cancellation and delay reasons may be auditable through the proposed consumer protection framework and will provide an evidence base from which to consider whether further regulatory action is required.

## 2.2 What we have already heard

The consultation paper [Establishing the Aviation Industry Ombuds Scheme](#) in August 2024 sought stakeholder feedback on the proposed powers to report on flight delays and cancellations. Consumer groups were strongly supportive of this initiative. A key theme of airline sector feedback was a desire to eliminate duplication of reporting to different government agencies. Some stakeholders also suggested the adoption of established reasons already used in the sector and in other jurisdictions.

Submissions to the [Review of the Air Navigation Regulation 2016](#) and consultation in relation to [reforms to the Sydney Airport Demand Management Framework](#) also indicated awareness of proposed data initiatives to which this discussion paper relates and sought the minimisation of duplicate reporting requirements.

## 2.3 Reporting on airline delay and cancellation – questions

1. Is basing the collection and publication of data about the reasons for flight delays and cancellations on the proposed IATA standards an effective, efficient and appropriately comprehensive approach? If not, please provide reasons and, if possible, suggestions of what additions or alternatives would work.

2. How should data be aggregated and presented for publication so as to balance commercial sensitivities with accessibility, increased transparency and public accountability (especially for consumers)?
3. Where a delay is a consequence of the preceding flight being delayed, would understanding the reasons for the initial delay be useful – for example, through the reports for these types of delays including the preceding aircraft's flight number?
4. On time performance reporting is currently contributed to, on a monthly basis, by Jetstar, Qantas, QantasLink, Regional Express, Virgin Australia, Virgin Australia Regional Airlines, SmartLynx and Hinterland for domestic flights. What transition and implementation factors need to be considered if, to increase public accountability and transparency, record keeping, data provision and publishing of reasons for flight delays and cancellations were to be broadened to include all airlines operating in Australia, including for international flights?
5. Do you have any comments on introducing a broader reporting period for flight cancellations than the current BITRE period (a flight is regarded as cancelled if it is removed from service within 7 days of scheduled departure)?
6. Do you have any other comments in relation to the implementation of a requirement for airlines to report reasons for delays and cancellations?

### 3. Impact of changes

These proposals are considered to have a minor regulatory burden on impacted businesses – that is, airlines.

Preliminary analysis suggests:

- the costs to airlines to provide the information would not be high – they largely already track complementary data in their operations and / or are already providing the information to the ACCC as part of existing monitoring
- the data is likely to provide beneficial insights, to government; and, where information may be disclosed publicly if warranted, other parties
- the risks of certain disclosures lessening competition or damaging the competitive position of individual firms are low. For example, BITRE currently publicly reports percentage ‘load factors’<sup>15</sup> aggregated across airlines that have provided data – that is, without identifying an individual airline’s load factors. Load factors can be an indirect indicator to an airline’s likely broad cost performance. We do not propose that BITRE publicly reports an individual airline’s load factors, as public disclosure may lessen competition or damage the competitive position of individual firms.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> Revenue passenger kilometres (the number of revenue passengers travelling on each flight stage times the distance between the ports) as a percentage of available seat kilometres (the number of seats available on each flight stage times the distance): see, for example, BITRE, *Statistical Report – Aviation – Domestic aviation activity – January 2025*, page 29, [https://www.bitre.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/domestic-aviation-activity\\_publication-jan-2025.pdf](https://www.bitre.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/domestic-aviation-activity_publication-jan-2025.pdf), accessed 5 May 2025.

<sup>16</sup> For example, an airline might be concerned that another airline, seeking to cause the first airline to exit a market (and so lessen competition) might use information about the first airline’s load factors to estimate its costs – and so, for instance, set fares for a sustained period below the first airline’s apparent cost of supply. The second airline might do this even if the fares are also below the second airline’s own cost of supply.

## Appendix A: Selected current ACCC reporting (major airlines) and similar BITRE reporting

ACCC reporting (Qantas Group, Rex and Virgin)	BITRE reporting
Price	
Average fare revenue per domestic passenger <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• overall</li> <li>• Major City routes</li> <li>• regional</li> <li>• remote</li> </ul> *ACCC not currently reporting by airline; usually publishes as an index (not dollar figure)	Domestic discount airfares (index) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• business</li> <li>• restricted economy</li> <li>• best discount</li> </ul> BITRE gathers this information from publicly available sources.
Share and capacity	
Share of passengers flown - all routes and by route category <sup>17</sup> - by identified domestic airline <sup>18</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Domestic Regular Public Transport passenger traffic (total passengers carried millions) – airlines aggregated</li> <li>• Revenue passenger kilometres (billions) – airlines aggregated</li> <li>• Available seats (millions) – airlines aggregated</li> <li>• Available seat kilometres (billions) – airlines aggregated</li> <li>• Aircraft trips (000s) – airlines aggregated</li> <li>• Airport traffic data – airlines aggregated               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ revenue passenger and aircraft movements – domestic and regional</li> <li>○ total passengers</li> </ul> </li> </ul> As discussed earlier, upon amendments to the regulation, BITRE would be able to identify each domestic airline’s result and share. BITRE can already effectively do this for international flights.
Number of domestic routes operated by airlines – by identified domestic airline	
Number of routes serviced by 1 airline group, 2 groups or more than 2 groups	

<sup>17</sup> All routes, larger cities – larger cities, larger cities – regional, regional – regional

<sup>18</sup> Jetstar, Qantas, Regional Express Virgin

Box 2 below summarises the combined effect of amending the Air Navigation Regulation to reform the disclosure limits with implementing additional indicators.

**Box 2: New data BITRE could include in its longitudinal data sets**

Price – from ACCC

- average fare revenue per domestic passenger

Capacity – from ACCC

- passengers carried by route category – overall, Major City Routes, regional, remote

Capacity – change from BITRE reporting all airlines aggregated to reporting by identified domestic airline

- revenue passenger kilometres
- available seats
- available seat kilometres
- aircraft trips

Market structure – change from BITRE reporting all airlines aggregated to reporting by identified domestic airline

- airport traffic data – revenue passenger and aircraft movements – domestic and regional

Market structure – new indicators

- number of domestic routes each airline serves
- average number of airlines operating on routes
- share of seats operated by Low Cost Carriers<sup>19</sup>

Market structure – from ACCC

- number of passengers on domestic routes serviced by number of airline groups (1, 2 or more)

---

<sup>19</sup> It is generally considered that Australia currently has only one domestic low cost carrier – Jetstar.

## Appendix B: IATA delay codes (Letter Method) – extract

Full list at: <https://iata-ahm732.azurewebsites.net/#/guided>

Group	Process	Reason (examples)
<b>1. Aircraft arrival</b>	A. Aircraft late/not ready: non-technical	Diversion, taxi-in time longer than normal, aircraft marshalling, stand blocked by aircraft, stand blocked by equipment, aircraft towing from another stand or hangar, foreign object debris check & stand clearance, removal of snow / ice / water / sand from airport, wildlife control, stand-by aircraft, additional security event / check, aircraft security, gate / stand – short term change, gate / stand – malfunction, reactionary – from another flight, industrial action, version / aircraft change, weather, extraordinary, infrastructure, late end or unknown reason
	B. Aircraft late/not ready: technical	Aircraft defect, release from scheduled maintenance, release from non-scheduled maintenance, damage found on arrival: documentation / airworthiness clarification – no repairs, aircraft repairs due to damage during flight operations, aircraft repairs due to damage during ground operations – unreported, spares, stand-by aircraft, documentation / labelling, IT, equipment, staff – error, staff – lack / late, industrial action, version / aircraft change, extraordinary, infrastructure, late end or unknown reason
	C. Inbound activity delaying outbound handling	Jet bridge / steps, arrival check, pax de-boarding, PRM de-boarding, VIP & other special assistance pax de-boarding, immigration, customs, transportation, health, off-schedule / groundtime / blocktime incl. early arrival, documentation / labelling, removal of snow / ice / water / sand from airport, aircraft malfunctions – deferred repairs, non-standard handling – high amount / excessive / special, unloading, gate / stand – malfunction, equipment, additional security event / check, aircraft security, version / aircraft change, weather, extraordinary, infrastructure, late end or unknown reason

## Appendix C: IATA schedule change codes, proposed as cancellation reasons

Code	Interpretation
AIRS	Airspace restrictions
ARPT	Airfield restrictions
COMM	Commercial reasons, demand or lack of demand
CREW	Crew shortage
DAMA	Aircraft damage
EQUI	Equipment shortage
FUEL	Fuel shortage
HDLG	Ground handling
HOLI	Holiday
INDU	Industrial dispute
OPER	Operational reasons
PERF	Aircraft performance
POLI	Political situation
POSI	Aircraft positioning
REPO	Aircraft re-positioning
ROTA	Aircraft rotation
RTNS	Return to normal schedule or reinstatement of flight status
RUNW	Runway restrictions
TECH	Technical reasons, maintenance, etc
WEAT	Weather conditions

Source: SSIM Chapter 5 for ad hoc schedule messages

Note: IATA's SSIM includes a code for "other reason". It is proposed this be excluded to achieve the intended purpose of improving transparency and accountability.