



AVIATION CONSUMER PROTECTIONS CONSULTATION

SUBMISSION ONE: PRIMARY LEGISLATION

The Qantas Group (the **Group**) welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Aviation Consumer Protections Consultation Paper (September 2025). We look forward to working with the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts (the **Department**) to build a stronger consumer protection framework for aviation in Australia.

As directed by the consultation paper, this submission focuses on the primary legislation (questions 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7). The Group's second submission will focus on the subordinate legislation (questions 4, 5, 8, and 9).

Aviation is vital to Australia's economy and liveability, connecting regions and communities. It's important in developing minimum standards for consumer protection that we maintain a healthy and sustainable aviation industry in Australia.

The Government, aviation industry, its customers and the broader community share a common interest in:

- Reducing delays and cancellations;
- Improving customer experience when things do go wrong; and
- Keeping airfares sustainable and affordable.

In designing the consumer protection framework, it is important that all of these factors are considered.

While consumers want certainty about what they can expect when flights are cancelled, delayed, and disrupted, they also value choice and reliability.

If the framework does not strike the right balance between consumer protections and the complexities and practical realities of the aviation industry, it could lead to unintended consequences for consumers. These include significant cost increases that limit airlines' ability to invest in customer-focused initiatives, such as new aircraft, or place upward pressure on airfares.

The Group's responses to the questions relating to the primary legislation are set out in more detail in **Attachment A**. Some key themes that the Group would like to make include:

- The Charter should apply to the airline that operates a flight, not the airline that marketed or sold the flight as is currently proposed.
- Ensure that minimum standards for airlines apply to circumstances within their control (e.g. engineering requirements) and exclude things that are outside of their control (e.g. weather, air traffic control delays), as is the case in other jurisdictions around the world.
- Expand the entities that the charter applies to, to all parts of the customer journey, including travel agents and government agencies like Airservices Australia, not just airlines and airports.



- Avoid duplication and confusion, by not overlapping or conflicting with existing international rules (like IATA resolutions), laws or globally accepted aviation industry practice (like the Montreal Convention, and the US Department of Transportation rules, guidance and enforcement orders for aviation consumer protection),
- Continue to allow airlines, particularly low-cost carriers, to provide refunds through credit vouchers in certain circumstances (e.g. delays outside an airline's control).
- Apply the Charter to all airlines flying within, to, or from Australia and all Australian airports. The consultation paper entertains only "potentially" including non-Australian airlines, which account for more than two thirds of international capacity to/from Australia.

Over the past two years we've been investing in our fleet, our operations and our people to improve and enhance the customer experience (see **Attachment B** for details).

We've also invested significantly in the way we communicate with and support our customers, particularly in times of disruption, and these improvements are reflected in these results.

While we're proud of the progress we've made, we know there's more to do, especially when things don't go to plan and that continues to be a focus for us.

We welcome further discussion and look forward to expanding on the points above in our second submission. We are committed to working with the Department to develop a fair and effective aviation consumer protection framework.

Attachment A – Responses to Questions Relating to Primary Legislation

Question 1 - Does the proposed regulation of airline services, airport services and airport accessibility services cover the core elements of the consumer aviation experience? Are there any missing elements?

Regulated entities

The Group supports enhanced consumer protection through the regulation of airline services and airport services, and acknowledges the services identified broadly cover the core elements of the aviation consumer experience.

The Group does not support the continued exclusion of travel agents as regulated entities under the framework.

We welcome the opportunity to provide the Department with further information where communication of customer contact information between travel agents and airlines has been critical to the consumer aviation experience, and the practical limitations of addressing this through any contractual relationships between an airline and travel agent.

Travel agents are a significant component of the aviation ecosystem, and their role in consumers' experience of aviation services is substantial. For example, the role of travel agents can include:

- Advising on relevant fees, terms and conditions (e.g. change, cancellation and baggage fees).
- Advice regarding visa requirements for travel.
- Capturing contact information (i.e. mobile phone number and email address)
- Capturing special service requirements (e.g. motorised wheelchair and other medical needs).
- In the event of disruptions outside of the operating window (72 hours prior to departure), communicating to and rebooking customers, providing customers with updated schedule information, and any refunds.

Errors made by travel agents in the booking process can have a significant impact on the journey of a customer. For example, a travel agent incorrectly recording the type of special assistance that a customer requires can then result in incorrect equipment and/or level of staffing to board the customer on to the aircraft (i.e. the service request is that the customer is requiring assistance with stairs; but is in fact travelling with a motorised wheelchair that requires a dangerous goods approval).

As highlighted in previous submissions, passengers booking indirectly through travel agents represent a significant proportion of all passengers carried by the Qantas Group. In FY25, 47 per cent of all Qantas bookings were indirect across all points of sale, representing 14.8 million bookings in total.

These intermediaries may include Global Distribution Systems (GDSs), Content Aggregators, Consolidators, Online Travel Agencies (OTAs), and Corporate Travel Management Companies (TMCs). In many cases, while the consumer interacts directly with the airline for service delivery, the identity of the B2C selling agent responsible for collecting the necessary data for service fulfilment is not always disclosed to the airline.

This lack of visibility presents challenges in ensuring compliance with consumer protection standards and regulatory obligations. Airlines are therefore dependent on third-party distribution systems to facilitate key outcomes, including those stipulated in the Charter. This reliance underscores the importance of transparency, data sharing, and accountability across the distribution ecosystem to ensure that regulatory expectations are met consistently. The continued exclusion of travel agents risks creating gaps in consumer protection and confusion amongst consumers, particularly in circumstances where travel agents hold the direct relationship with the consumer.

Should the Government decide not to extend the scope of the Scheme to travel agents, it is essential that, at a minimum, travel agents are required to include the customer's bona-fide contact details (email address and mobile phone number in international format) in the booking. This would enable efficient communication and recovery in the event of disruption.

We recommend that IATA Resolution 830d(4) - Reservations Procedures for IATA Accredited Agents requirements be considered to ensure agents provide airlines with passenger contact details and notify customers of reservation changes and in addition make this mandatory. This should include online travel agents based overseas and selling to Australian consumers, not just IATA-accredited agents.

Regulated activities

The Group broadly supports the proposed scope of regulated activities, which encompasses the key elements of the consumer journey. This includes flight bookings (subject to the comments regarding travel agents above), check-in and boarding, flight disruptions, delays and cancellations, baggage handling, complaint handling processes, and airport accessibility services (with further comments provided in response to Question 3 below).

The Group encourages consideration be given to extend the scope of "regulated activities" to include security activities. This is because security screening can form an important part of the consumer aviation experience.

While we support the inclusion of baggage within the scope of regulated activities, it is critical to emphasise that baggage liability is already comprehensively governed by the Montreal Convention 1999 (MC99) and the Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act 1959 (CACL). Any inconsistency or overlap between the proposed framework and these existing legal instruments risks creating confusion regarding the applicable rules and the appropriate forum for redress. Many international jurisdictions, including Canada and the European Union, defer to MC99 for baggage matters, and even where local requirements exist, they are subject to the liability limits and exclusivity provisions of MC99. The framework should therefore ensure that any regulation of baggage is fully consistent with, and does not duplicate or conflict with, the established international and domestic legal regime and this is reflected in the language of the Charter to manage consumers' expectations.

Question 2 - Are there any operational or technical considerations regarding international flights that would affect their regulation under the framework?

Operational Challenges

The Group recommends clear definitions regarding which international flights are covered, especially for inbound services and application to codeshare flights. This is important because for example Qantas and Jetstar account for approximately 30 per cent of international passenger carriage to/from Australia, while other international carriers account for 70 per cent.¹

These definitions should also exclude airlines that do not operate to and from Australia. Eg. Jetstar's domestic operation in New Zealand and Jetstar Japan.

The consultation paper proposes that the regulatory framework should generally apply only where a consumer has a direct relationship with an airport (for airport services) or with an airline (for airline services). Under this approach, the regulated entity is the airline the consumer has a direct commercial relationship with, even if the flight is operated by another airline.

The aviation industry operates through an interconnected system of codeshare, interline, marketing carriers, operating carriers, ticketing carriers, and travel agents. For example, Qantas has approximately 30 codeshare and over 130 interline partners, providing reach to over 1,300 destinations. Consumers benefit from such interconnection as it delivers consumers greater choice and convenience. The regulatory framework should be adapted to

¹ Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economic (BITRE) 2025, *International airline activity*, Statistical Report, BITRE Canberra, ACT.

this and drive accountability with regulated entities for matters within their control.

For example, the consultation paper suggests that the marketing carrier (the airline that sells the ticket) would be responsible for services provided by third parties, such as codeshare or interline partners. However, globally accepted industry practice is that the operating carrier (the airline actually operating the flight) that communicates directly with passengers during the operational window, especially in cases of disruption. This is because the operating airline has direct information about the extent of the delay, the reason for delay (i.e. inside or outside of control), alternative flights available, they often have an airport presence with staff available to assist customers and as the operating airline are responsible for arranging accommodation, meals, and transportation (where the disruption is within the airline's control). They may also have agreements with local hotels and food and beverage suppliers to ensure large groups of passengers promptly receive the assistance required. While the marketing carrier has the customers' details, these have been provided to the operating carrier so the operating carrier can directly communicate with passengers in relation to the provision of the airline services, including in the event of disruption. Similarly, when a booking is made through a travel agent, the agent is responsible for communicating with the customer, unless the disruption occurs during the operational window in which case it is the operating carrier that contacts the customer directly and hence why obtaining the passenger's contact details is critical.

The following case studies are based on real experience and shared for illustrative purposes only. The Group welcomes an opportunity to provide the Department with further case studies.

Case Study 1:

A customer books one ticket through the Qantas website and the itinerary is completely operated by a foreign airline (as an airline partner) (e.g. from Sydney to Dubai to Venice). That flight has a mechanical disruption within the control of the foreign airline in Sydney. In this instance, the foreign airline as the operating carrier is responsible for rebooking the customer, communicating the updated itinerary, and organising any accommodation, meals and transport. Not Qantas as the marketing carrier.

This aligns with IATA resolutions and fundamentally reflects how airlines globally manage the commercial risks associated with airline partnerships. Given the operating airline bears the majority of costs, it is also the operating airline that receives the majority value of the ticket (not the marketing airline).

Case Study 2:

A customer purchases a ticket through the Qantas website, involving some parts of the itinerary operated by Qantas and other parts a foreign carrier with whom Qantas has a codeshare agreement. The customer travels outbound from Australia on a Qantas service from Melbourne to Dallas with a connection to New York, operated by the foreign carrier with no issues.

On the return to Australia, the customer experiences an engineering disruption in New York with the foreign carrier, which Qantas would not be aware of given there is no impact to Qantas flights operating from Dallas. The foreign carrier (as the operating carrier) therefore takes responsibility for rebooking the customer, as per IATA Resolutions.

During this re-booking, the customer is routed via Canada on the next available itinerary. However, Canada requires an advance arrangement of a Visa Waiver for Australian citizens and as such the customer is denied entry to Canada and because of this is further disrupted, resulting in a claim to the airline for out-of-pocket expenses.

In this case, such claims for reimbursement should be directed to the foreign carrier responsible for operating the flight (the operating carrier), but if this claim is directed to Qantas (the marketing carrier), a significant delay and coordination challenge would exist to identify the service failure and provide reimbursement. In this scenario, according to the proposed framework Qantas would be responsible for reimbursing the out-of-pocket expenses despite this being outside of its control.

Case Study 3:

A customer purchases a ticket with a foreign carrier with whom Qantas has a codeshare agreement, for travel from Manchester, UK to Coffs Harbour (via Sydney) and back; involving a combination of Qantas and foreign carrier operated services. On the customer's return trip, Qantas experiences a delay (within our control) in Coffs Harbour, resulting in the customer now misconnecting with the foreign carrier from Sydney back to Manchester. The foreign carrier does not have a presence at Coffs Harbour and relies on the operating carrier (Qantas) to ensure that the customer receives assistance.

In this example the customer requires hotel accommodation, provision of food & beverage, or transport; and support rebooking their onward flights back to Manchester via Sydney. However, if the carrier responsible is that of the direct commercial relationship (i.e. the foreign carrier), this will likely disadvantage customers who booked with the foreign carrier (versus other customers on the same Qantas flight) and create confusion for customers and both Qantas and the foreign carrier. According to the consultation paper the customer who booked with the foreign carrier would be required to submit for reimbursement with the foreign carrier, rather than receive provisions like other customers on the same flight from Qantas (as the operating carrier) at the time of disruption.

If the framework places obligations on the marketing/ticketing carrier for services delivered by other parties, this could create significant operational challenges, as the marketing carrier may not have visibility or control over the actions of the operating carrier. These challenges are further compounded if, for example, airlines flying internationally to Australia are excluded from the scheme, as indicated in Section 2.2 of the consultation paper.

To address these issues, the scheme should clearly define the regulated entity responsible as the operating carrier – the party delivering the service to the consumer. In cases involving codeshare or interline agreements, the relationship and responsibilities between the marketing and operating carriers should be clearly articulated to ensure accountability and effective consumer protection.

Nevertheless, noting the potential for consumer confusion, the Group suggests an obligation on marketing carriers to support consumers to be able to readily identify and contact relevant operating carriers under different scenarios can both help consumers whilst reflecting common global industry practice.

Competitive Distortion Risk

To avoid competitive distortion, the Group suggests all airlines operating domestic flights, airlines flying internationally from Australia, airlines flying internationally to Australia and all Australian airports should be captured by the scheme. In addition, wet leased operations should be captured by the Scheme. We support the government's proposal that inclusion should not be distinguished by the size of the regulated entity.

However, the Group recognises the risk of regulatory overlap and conflict with other jurisdictions for international airline services to Australia and Australian airlines flying internationally. Therefore, the minimum standards in the Charter should apply only if the passenger has not already received remedy under the law of the country where the flight originated, in a similar way to the application of EU261. Passengers should not be permitted to "double-dip" and claim entitlements under both the Australian regime and the regime of a foreign jurisdiction.

Question 3 - Are there any operational or technical considerations regarding airport accessibility services that would affect their regulation under the framework?

The Group supports the inclusion of airport accessibility services within the regulatory framework and recognises the importance of ensuring appropriate protections for consumers with accessibility requirements throughout their airport journey.

We acknowledge the government's intention to include airport accessibility services even where there is not a direct consumer relationship. However, for the framework to be effective, it is essential to clearly delineate the responsibilities of airlines and airports for accessibility

services and for the obligations of the Charter to be more clearly defined. In particular, there should be clarity regarding which party is responsible for services provided from entry points (such as car parks, public transport, and kerbside) to check-in, and from baggage claim to exit points (including pick-up areas, car parks, and public transport). This will help avoid confusion, ensure accountability, and deliver consistent experiences for consumers.

Effective delivery of accessibility services also depends on accurate, timely information being provided by customers at the time of booking – including the information captured by travel agents. The framework should therefore require travel agents to accurately collect accessibility information.

We support the proposal for the Minister to have the power to make rules (through subordinate legislation) to clarify or adjust the types of services included as airport accessibility services. This flexibility will be important as the consumer ombuds scheme is implemented and as Accessible Aviation Transport Standards are developed, ensuring that expectations, obligations, and responsibilities remain clear and duplication or overlaps are reduced.

Finally, it is important there is a clear distinction between the role of the proposed minimum standards versus the Accessible Aviation Transport Standards under separate development to avoid duplication and confusion.

Question 6 - Is the role of the ACPA as proposed sufficient to protect aviation consumers and lift consumer standards, while not imposing undue regulatory burden and costs on the sector?

The Group notes the establishment of the newly proposed Aviation Consumer Protection Authority (ACPA) is to make, administer, and enforce the Charter. We welcome the acknowledgement that the ACPA's initial focus will be on educating regulated entities about the Charter's standards before commencing compliance activity. We also believe it is essential that both the ACPA and the Aviation Consumer Ombudsperson (ACO) invest in educating consumers about the Charter and the broader consumer protection framework.

However, given the potential for overlapping conduct that may fall within the enforcement remit of both the ACPA and/or other regulators such as Australian or state or territory fair trading departments or overseas regulators, further detail on how the ACPA would function within the current structure is required.

We recognise the need for an independent regulator with monitoring, investigative, and enforcement powers. However, it is important to note that the ACPA represents a new regulatory function within the department and adds to an already complex landscape of regulatory oversight in the aviation sector.

To ensure proportionality and avoid duplication, there must be clear delineation between the roles of the ACPA and other departments. We recommend that the ACPA's focus be limited to systemic or serious breaches of the Charter. This distinction is especially important in relation to the proposed 'Own Motion' power, which allows the ACPA to proactively investigate systemic issues without referral from the ACO and could otherwise overlap with other regulator's investigative remits.

We support the development and publication of an enforcement and compliance strategy by the ACPA to provide transparency for regulated entities and the public. We acknowledge that enforcement powers may include civil penalties, infringement notices, court enforceable undertakings, and injunctions, and would welcome further detail on the scope and application of these powers and the opportunity to input into these.

Without additional information on the exact role and scope of the ACPA's regulatory oversight, it is difficult to fully assess the additional regulatory burden that may result. However, it is clear that the establishment of the ACPA will create additional compliance obligations for airlines, who will need to resource and support this new oversight in addition to the requirements of the Ombuds Scheme.

We note the proposal for enforcement functions to include penalties for victimisation of complainants. In this regard, the framework should make clear that such provisions do not prevent airlines from

taking necessary actions to ensure safety, including imposing bans on customers who have breached Conditions of Carriage (e.g., in cases of disruptive or abusive behaviour).

Question 7 - Do the proposed functions and powers of the ACO provide sufficient capability to efficiently resolve consumer complaints and improve consumer standards? If not, what should change and why?

Reporting and Complaint Scope

The Group broadly supports the proposed functions and powers of the Aviation Consumer Ombudsperson (ACO) to provide independent, fair, and accessible dispute resolution.

In addition to its complaint handling powers, the Group agrees that the ACO should focus efforts on providing education and guidance to consumers to understand their rights and obligations. This should not be constrained to just the rights and obligations of the regulated entities but also more broadly about the role, responsibilities, accountabilities and complaint functions of other entities within the eco-system e.g. the responsibilities and accountabilities of travel agents.

The Group supports the ACO reporting on matters directly related to its own role, function, and performance and matters involving regulated entities that it is involved with (e.g. volumes and types of airlines complaints it is involved with). This should not be extended to matters that it is not involved in (e.g. complaints regulated entities respond to and resolve inhouse).

We also do not agree that the ACO should accept complaints relating to service failures attributable to travel agents (e.g. ticketing errors, incorrect advice regarding visa requirements, or failure to provide updated schedule information) or other government bodies, if travel agents and government bodies are not to be regulated entities. Airlines should not be held accountable for errors made by travel agents, and this should be explicitly stated in the eligibility criteria.

We agree that a clearly defined scope of complaints is essential, which should reflect a balanced approach and the intention of setting reasonable minimum standards, and support the list of ineligible complaints identified in section 4.2. We also support the exclusion of complaints relating to privacy, personal injury, and death (in accordance with footnote 9).

Without clear articulation of ineligible complaints - particularly those relating to out-of-scope entities - there is a significant risk of consumer confusion and high volume of ineligible complaints to the ACO.

The Group supports working with the Department and other industry stakeholders to clearly delineate what is included in Airport Services versus Airline Services to ensure accountability for minimum standards are practically achievable.

Complaint Process

Overall, the Group supports the six-stage complaint process. However, further clarity and detail on the definition of an eligible complaint that could be considered by the ACO is required.

We welcome the requirement for consumers to attempt to resolve their complaint directly with the airline or airport at Stage 1 and recognise that a 30-day period is generally appropriate (noting that complex baggage issues may require longer). We note that complaints should be lodged through a formal channel in accordance with the airline's complaints handling process; relate to an event that occurred with the last 12 months; and after the complainant has attempted to seek resolution from the airline.

We support the use of an ACO webform (Stage 2) to confirm eligibility as the main channel for complaint lodgement, and the referral back to the airline for eligible complaints (Stage 3), with a maximum of 20 business days to resolve before escalation to Stage 4 (Case Management). This timeframe reflects what could reasonably be a minimum standard. We also recommend consideration of an extension or carve-out for extraordinary circumstances where more time may be required.

Any remedies provided by the Ombuds Scheme as part of its dispute resolution function (Stage 5) should be in line with existing law, including the Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act 1959 (Cth), the

Montreal Convention, Australian Consumer Law, and carrier terms and conditions for domestic and international carriage. The application of liability under law should be clearly expressed in the stated powers and functions of the Scheme, including any limitations on remedies.

We agree that the ACO should be able to treat a complaint as withdrawn if a complainant does not respond within a reasonable timeframe, and that the ACO should have powers to decline to continue handling a complaint (e.g., if another regulatory authority has considered the complaint or if it is frivolous or vexatious). We also support the ACO's ability to refer complaints to another, more appropriate body where relevant.

Aircraft Noise Ombudsman

The Group supports the proposal for the Aircraft Noise Ombudsman (ANO) to change to be an independent statutory position (rather than reporting the Board of Airservices Australia or the Chief of Air Force), and welcomes the clarity provided in the consultation paper that the ANO would continue to conduct its current functions.

We recognise the potential benefits of streamlining governance arrangements, including co-locating the ANO and ACO within the Aviation Ombuds Office (AOO) and potentially sharing administrative support. However, given the very different disciplines, technical requirements, expertise and oversight responsibilities involved and different stakeholders, we do not believe that the roles of the ANO and ACO can or should be vested in a single individual.

We welcome the government's commitment to consult stakeholders on the transition of ANO functions and request further detail on how this transition will be managed before commenting comprehensively on the governance arrangements for this component of the scheme. In addition, it is our understanding that the Aircraft Noise Ombudsman (ANO) is currently funded by Airservices Australia and the Department of Defence. Should there be a proposal to streamline governance arrangements and share support staff etc, the Group would welcome clarity on how proposed funding mechanisms would support equitable funding allocation.

Attachment B – Qantas Group’s Customer Investment and Improved Results

- In FY25, Qantas was the most on-time major airline, while Jetstar’s punctuality also improved by three percentage points (Qantas and Jetstar’s best on-time performance since FY19).²
- This helped deliver an increase in customer satisfaction with the Net Promoter Score for Qantas jumping 10 points, and Jetstar up six points.³
- In late September 2025, the first two Qantas A321XLR aircraft [entered service](#) on our domestic network, part of our historic fleet renewal program with 214 new aircraft on order over the next decade.
- Complaint handling times for eligible complaints to the Airline Customer Advocate for Qantas dropped by 89 per cent to 11 days in 2024 compared to the prior year.⁴
- Qantas successfully resolved 84 per cent of eligible complaints to the Airline Customer Advocate, the highest resolution rate of any airline.⁵
- How we are investing in our customers:⁶

² Percentage of Qantas Domestic/QantasLink and Jetstar domestic flights that departed on time in FY25 compared to FY24. Source: BITRE.

³ See [Qantas Group FY25 Investor Presentation](#).

⁴ [Airline Customer Advocate Annual Report 2024](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

Leading ground experience



Exceptional flying experience




FY25 performance

Qantas Airlines Reputation (RepTrak Score)



Airline NPS (Domestic and International)



Key Drivers of NPS

- **On Time Performance** – Qantas Domestic increased 2ppts to 77%¹; Jetstar Domestic increased 3ppts to 73%¹
- **Customer satisfaction** – Improved customer satisfaction across every Qantas and Jetstar journey touch point in FY25
- **Brand** – Reputation and brand perceptions rebuilding at a strong and steady pace

FY25 Highlights

- Rolled out Group Boarding across all Qantas Domestic and International ports improving OTP
- Opened Adelaide Lounge Precinct including new Qantas Club and Business Lounges
- New Broome Regional Lounge as part of the regional lounge refresh program

- New aircraft deliveries: Qantas' first A321XLR; QantasLink 5 x A220s; Jetstar 7 x A321LRs and 4 x A320neos
- Redesigned Qantas International Business and Economy food and beverage service
- Qantas International Wi-Fi activated across Southeast Asia and trans-Tasman routes

Forward Focus

- Ongoing lounge development: Auckland International (Feb-26) and Sydney International Business Lounge (FY27)
- Refreshing Los Angeles Business Lounge (Feb-26)
- Investment in baggage solutions (e.g. enhanced self-service, communication and tracking)


- Qantas International First-Class dining and service experience enhancement
- Cabin refresh: Qantas A330s (first aircraft into service from Feb-26), Jetstar 787s (from Apr-26)
- Qantas International Wi-Fi activation: Broader Asia from Dec-25

Seamless digital experience



- Expanded the digital Australian Travel Declaration trial to more Qantas passengers
- Uplifted Qantas self-service functionality and transparency for changes to travel plans
- Improved Jetstar customer purchasing and self-service (e.g. in-app ancillary purchases)

Trusted to recover well



- Streamlined flight status information across digital channels, airport screens and announcements
- Launched use of Uber vouchers to disrupted Qantas passengers in key ports
- Capability for rapid and scalable flight recovery with key Qantas and Jetstar airline partners

Unrivalled reward and recognition



>7 million
Seats booked using
Qantas points¹

Launched Classic Plus (Domestic), new airline partners, American Airlines upgrades



1 in 4

Members using Classic Plus to redeem for the first time in 5 years²



5,700 Points
Lowest one-way reward
fare in Australia³

QFF rewards on Jetstar flights including lowest one-way economy reward fare in Australia & upgrades⁴

FY25 Highlights

Forward Focus

- Simplifying website navigation, followed by a full redesign of Qantas.com by end of FY26
- Streamlining partner airline check-in experience across Qantas digital channels
- New Jetstar products and bundle offerings, and uplifts to digital experience (e.g. Google pay)
- Development and progressive transition to a new Qantas disruption management engine
- Uplifting Qantas disruption communications, with disruption reasons and personalised information
- Enhancing Jetstar chatbot and agent tooling for more efficient customer care