



Australian Government

Department of Infrastructure, Transport,
Regional Development and Local Government



Review of Aviation Security Screening: Report

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations



Objective I: To ensure that the security outcome from Australian aviation security screening is agreed and clearly articulated.

No.	Recommendation
1	<p>The Screening Review recommends that the definition of aviation security screening, the purpose of screening and its expected outcomes be considered for incorporation into the Methods, Techniques and Equipment to be used for Screening and as a supplement to the Office of Transport Security regulatory philosophy, training material and any communications material relating to screening.</p> <p>The Screening Review's proposed <u>definition</u> of aviation security screening is:</p> <p>'Aviation security screening is the application of human, technical or other means to identify and/or detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles, substances, or other prohibited items or behaviours which may be used to commit, or indicate an intention to commit, an act of unlawful interference against aviation.'</p> <p>The Screening Review also proposes the following definition for the <u>purpose</u> of screening:</p> <p>'The purpose of screening in Australia is to contribute towards the protection of the aircraft from unlawful interference.'</p> <p>Expected <u>outcomes</u> of aviation security screening are to mitigate against:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ unlawful seizure of an aircraft;▪ hostage taking on board an aircraft;▪ intrusion on board an aircraft of a weapon or other material capable of threatening the integrity of an airframe; and▪ the use of the aircraft as a weapon. <p>Screening is only one component of a harmonised and integrated preventive security regime.</p>

2	<p>The Screening Review recommends improving screening outcomes by refining the list of prohibited items, taking into account the nature and level of threat, to support the identification at screening points of items capable of causing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ unlawful seizure of an aircraft; ▪ hostage taking on board an aircraft; ▪ intrusion on board an aircraft of a weapon or other material capable of threatening the integrity of an airframe; and ▪ the use of the aircraft as a weapon. <p>This should be achieved through harmonisation with international standards where it is in Australia’s interests to do so.</p>
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Objective II: To ensure that the approach to and delivery of Australian aviation security screening is nationally consistent.

No.	Recommendation
3	The Screening Review recommends that the Australian Government notes that national consistency in the screening outcome is both feasible and desirable and will be achievable through performance measurement designed to raise overall standards.
4	The Screening Review recommends that the Office of Transport Security, together with intelligence agencies and industry, strengthen the regular review of screening to ensure that screening measures are commensurate with intelligence and the nature and level of threats.
5	The Screening Review recommends that a new performance measurement framework should be developed and implemented in partnership with industry.
6	The Screening Review recommends that performance measurement information be shared between the Office of Transport Security, screening authorities, screening providers and airport operators.
7	The Screening Review recommends that all testing regimes must be designed to ensure the adequacy and robustness of the security regime. They must be relevant, and there must be an adequate range of testing in different locations and across the range of mandated security measures over time to establish meaningful and measurable trends. Information regarding the outcomes of overt and covert testing should be managed on the need-to-know basis to support continuous improvement and encourage a just culture relationship between the regulator and industry, and within the industry.

8	The Screening Review recommends that the Aviation Security Training Program be implemented and further developed in future years.
9	The Screening Review recommends the removal of the regulatory requirement for those personnel performing aviation security screening functions to be licensed as security guards according to the requirements of state or territory legislation. Decisions regarding additional requirements are to be agreed between screening authorities and screening providers.

Objective III: To ensure that the regulatory regime is appropriate to the agreed security outcome.

No.	Recommendation
10	The Screening Review recommends that the Office of Transport Security consolidate and clarify the existing written notices under Regulation 4.17—Methods, Techniques and Equipment to be used for Screening by the end of 2009.
11	The Screening Review recommends that <i>concurrently</i> with Recommendation 10, the Office of Transport Security develop a new outcomes-based framework for implementation of Regulation 4.17, which clearly links performance of security screening processes to the nature and level of threat, and to local security risk assessments as articulated in the transport security programs of aviation industry participants.
12	Noting the divergent views that have been expressed in submissions to the Screening Review, it is recommended that the Australian Government conduct further analysis of alternative screening models.

Objective IV: To ensure Australian aviation security screening operates in a manner which achieves the agreed security outcome in an efficient and effective manner.

No.	Recommendation
13	The Screening Review recommends that airports, airlines, screening providers and the Office of Transport Security continuously develop and refine knowledge on best practice screening systems and techniques and continue to share this with industry on a regular basis through industry forums and working groups.
14	The Screening Review recommends that the Australian Government continues to develop its capacity through coordination of research and development activities across agencies and leveraging international counterparts where appropriate, in screening technologies and human factors.

15	<p>Noting the varying nature of screened airports in Australia, it is recommended that where the Office of Transport Security is considering changes to aviation security measures, the Office of Transport Security:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ advises why the change is required; ▪ analyses likely impacts and costs; ▪ ensures adequate consultation occurs prior to any decision being made; and ▪ provides targeted support where appropriate.
16	<p>The Screening Review recommends that the Office of Transport Security conduct research, analysis, and field trials where appropriate, to determine what technologies and other processes could be introduced to improve the effectiveness of the screening process, including better detection of explosives and other chemical, biological or radiological threats. This should include but not be limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ behaviour analysis; ▪ detection by canine olfaction; and ▪ technologies such as explosives detection capable X-ray or computed tomography for carry-on baggage.
17	<p>The Screening Review recommends that a biennial national key stakeholder forum be established for sharing best practice information on screening.</p>
18	<p>The Screening Review recommends that best practice principles on screening point design be developed by the Office of Transport Security in collaboration with industry by the middle of 2009. Beyond this date new material should continue to be developed and shared across the sector as new design initiatives and equipment become available.</p>
19	<p>The Screening Review recommends that all personnel performing aviation security screening functions be referred to as Aviation Protection Officers to better reflect the specialist role of the workforce.</p>
20	<p>The Screening Review recommends that the option of providing all personnel performing aviation security screening functions with a distinctive and consistent national uniform be examined by the Office of Transport Security in collaboration with industry stakeholders.</p>
21	<p>The Screening Review recommends that the regulatory requirement for personnel performing aviation security screening functions to hold a Certificate II in Security Operations be removed. All persons in all roles in the screening process must have achieved competency in the area they are performing work as specified in the Aviation Transport Security Regulations.</p>

22	The Screening Review recommends that customer service and conflict resolution training for those personnel performing aviation security screening functions with public interaction responsibilities be developed and implemented by mid 2010.
23	The Screening Review recommends that a standard feedback mechanism be developed for complaints and compliments at screening points in Australia, to be handled at the screening point in the first instance, for voluntary adoption by industry.
24	The Screening Review recommends that current procedures be enhanced, and be more formalised, by the Office of Transport Security to identify feedback which warrants further investigation, including the provision of better information to the public through the Office of Transport Security website.
25	The Screening Review recommends that best practice material for handling special circumstances screening be developed, and that any inconsistencies be addressed through training, and public education.
26	The Screening Review recommends that, the Australian Government and industry stakeholders continue to conduct research and information sharing into passenger facilitation.
27	<p>The Screening Review recommends the development of a national communication strategy targeting the travelling public to contribute towards an improved security outcome and improved consistency of experience. Materials should focus on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ public preparedness for screening; ▪ public acceptance of some variability in the screening experience; ▪ the role and responsibility of personnel performing aviation security screening functions; ▪ special circumstances; and ▪ mechanisms for the public providing feedback to industry and the regulator.